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EMOTION AND THE GOOD IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT[1]

I

The cognitive-developmental theory of moral development constructed by Piaget and Kohlberg is certainly the leading position in this area today; its concern with the philosophical roots of moral education is matched by its success in putting certain general tenets about ethical psychology to the experimental test.[2] However, the theory is not free of problems. One objection often raised is that Kohlberg and his associates have paid too little attention to the *content* of moral judgments, that is, the claims about goods or values implicit in making a moral decision.[3] This is, of course, consistent with their theory; cognitive-developmental theory holds that moral principles can be derived from the *form* of reasoning alone. On this account either value-judgments are subjective (such as individual interests and tastes) or, it may be suggested, they follow necessarily from the reasoning form of universality (thus Kohlberg regularly invokes the value or dignity of the person). But it is arguable that neither is the case. On the one hand, it can be shown that if values are purely subjective, then it is impossible to reach conclusive answers on most moral questions, answers that any rational agent would have to accept, since the principle of universalizability alone is not sufficient to determine the answer.[4] On the other, since the universalizability rule functions as a purely negative negative principle and prescinds from content altogether, it seems impossible to derive from it any of the basic values which Kohlberg and his associates certainly wish to maintain, such as that of human life.

While these points obviously merit considerable discussion and argument, this has been carried out elsewhere and will not be repeated here, so that a further issue can be examined. One of the reasons for the attractiveness of Kohlberg's formalist theory has been the lack of a widely acceptable theory of how goods or values could come to be rationally known, susceptible to empirical investigation in the same way as are Kohlberg's claims. The purpose of this paper is to suggest in outline such a theory, and to attempt to improve on Kohlberg's position by extending the theory of development to include those aspects which cognitive-developmental theory seems to leave out.

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Let us assume, then, that there is a part of moral development that consists in knowing what is good, which forms the content of moral judgment; we must consider how this occurs, and then proceed to investigate the development and the education of persons' abilities to know what is valuable. In this paper I wish to suggest a view based on many sources, recent and classical, but particularly indebted to the formulations of Alexius Meinong, a turn-of-the-century Austrian phenomenologist, and to some extent his teacher Franz Brentano.[5] I will adopt Meinong's name for the central function of "emotional presentation." I will not, however, attempt a detailed exegesis of Meinong's own theory, but rather will use Meinong's views as inspiration for constructing a position able to fill the lacuna in cognitive-developmental theory.

In the following discussion it should be noted that I will be taking "good" or "value" to mean *objective intrinsic* value, that is, a worth or importance actually belonging to the thing which is said to be good. It is often argued that there is no such thing, partly for the reason cited above: that theories to account for it have so often failed to be convincing. Yet it is extremely difficult to construct any ethical theory which does not assume at some point that something is of intrinsic value, rationally desirable for its own sake and not merely as a means to something else.[6] Many things are so evidently worthwhile that they can be used as a final goal in ethics without noticing that an "objective value" has been invoked: social welfare, pleasure, the satisfaction of individuals' interests. To argue that these and other things are really good is impossible here. For the purpose of this paper, then, it will be assumed that what we must account for is human knowledge of some things (actions, objects, events) as really, objectively, and inherently good, so that moral judgments based on them will have real, objective, and universal obligatory force. The question of *which* things are good we leave aside.

II

I wish to suggest that a central role in value-knowledge is played by the emotions: that in emotional response values are revealed, just as in sensation the physical qualities of things are revealed. Before this claim is set forth in detail, however, it is necessary to consider briefly what is meant by "emotion," a subject itself able to fill several volumes.

An emotion may be defined as an affective response by a person to an object. It is, then, a particular action or state, not a permanent structure of the character. "Feeling" is often used as synonymous with "emotion,"

although in other cases it is taken to mean simple pleasure or displeasure alone.[7] We may proceed to distinguish emotions from similar and related states by examining the various elements of this definition.

An emotion is an *affective* reaction: it is for or against its object. In it the person "goes out toward" something or "recoils from" it. Thus there is a bipolarity to emotion: it may be pro or con, accepting or rejecting, endorsing or condemning.[8] In a positive emotion one feels that something *ought to be*, one wishes or hopes that it will be, or one rejoices in its presence; in a negative emotion the opposite is the case. This familiar fact is most evident in the emotions that are simple, in the sense that they consist wholly in this endorsement or rejection of a thing:[9] we may refer to them as love and hatred, taking both in a broad sense. In the development that follows I will be referring to love and hate when speaking of the presenting or cognitive role of the emotions; it is impossible here to deal with the question of similar roles for other emotions.

An emotion is a *response* to something: not merely a passive experiencing of it, but an "answer" by the person to the thing (which, of course, must be experienced to be answered; so that emotion obviously includes or is based on some receptive experience as well). Love of something may or may not involve an actual tendency to "seek" it in some fashion (to possess it, to consume it, to mate with it). It often does, and this is not a merely casual connection: if something is perceived and loved as *good for us to eat*, that constitutes a *prima facie* reason for eating it. But this is not always the case: one can feel an outrush of admiration or awe in the face of great natural beauty or great personal magnetism without wanting to *do* anything at all about that person or scene. Thus emotion should be distinguished from *desire*: an emotion may well give rise to a desire, but they are not the same thing.[10] There is an almost "contemplative" endorsement of a thing, if the word may be used cautiously. Love does not necessarily imply desire; yet a pro-feeling about something certainly has more connection with action than does a physical description, even if it does not stimulate desire.[11] It seems plausible to express that connection this way. We may "worship from afar" someone or something that we do not currently want to gain (or presumably to produce or create, since it already exists). Yet if it were endangered, we would want to preserve it, we would be "in support" of it, "on its side," "in favor of it"; and we may say that if it *had* been my choice whether this person or thing or situation should exist, I would have chosen in its favor. Similarly, we may say of an impossible thing that we would have chosen to have it be, if that were within our power ("would that he were

still alive . . . "). Our response, then, may or may not involve actual motivation to do something, but it involves at least a sort of "hypothetical" motivation; the *response* is almost wholly internal, and it is for this reason that we might call it quasi-contemplative.

An emotion is the response *of a person*. Many writers have emphasized the involvement of the whole person in affective response: there is both general and particular knowledge and awareness of the object, there may be desire, there is typically a bodily "resonance" or involvement of autonomic processes such as heartbeat and breathing.[12] Carrying on the point just made, we may note that an emotion may be expressed in words, in actions, in thought, or simply in the bodily response of whose significance the agent may not even be aware.

An emotion is response *to an object*: "object" here should be taken to mean "logical object," any person, thing, act, event, state, quality, or relation to which attention may be directed. But there must be something which is responded *to*: this "pole" of the affect is as essential to it as the "pole" of the agent in whom it occurs. We may thus distinguish emotions from *moods*, which are typically general "colorations" of our experience that cannot be pinned down to a precise object (and thus we typically ascribe them to our own temperament or history rather than to "objective reality").[13]

These last two points form another "bipolarity" in emotion, that of subject and object. Unlike the positive-negative polarity, this one is shared with sensation and thought in general. Meinong and Brentano, as well as other phenomenologists, reworking a position held in the Middle Ages, refer to this quality as "intentionality."[14] Thought is normally *about* something; it is essential to a given idea (or conception or perception) that it is an idea *of*. Similarly, an emotion is about something: the very words "love" or "hate" demand objects to complete their sense. It is because thinking or feeling has this double nature, with one "foot" in the subject and one in the object, that it can bridge the epistemological gap and explain how the knower is aware of the known.

It is impossible to do full justice to the notion of intentionality here. The central point for our purposes is that the emotions possess that same "aboutness" characteristic of thought and sensation, which are generally recognized as leading to or constituting knowledge of things. The eye, or the picture on the retina, is not identical with the person seen; yet in some way it manages to reveal the person to us, or, in the technical terminology of Meinong, to "present" it. Since emotion also possesses an "aboutness," it seems plausible to say that it may also present an object to us in some

fashion. Note that no sensation presents the person as a whole, in every possible respect: we may see the overall shape or feel the skin texture, but a vast ensemble of such perceptions, along with much reasoning concerning the physical and psychological makeup, history, and context, would be necessary to build up what might roughly be called a "complete" knowledge of the person.[15] This raises the question whether there may be still further things about the person which require *emotional* presentation to be known, whether the complete picture might not involve not only seeing, touching, tasting, measuring, but even loving the person in the appropriate way. We are led, then, to question what it is about the object that is presented in our emotional response to it.

As the sensation of heat or of redness is accepted normally as revealing heat or a red color in the object (however these may be further analyzed theoretically), so it seems reasonable to accept the quality revealed in the emotion as *in the object*, for it certainly presents itself that way. My feeling of love is *my* feeling, yet it is not *about* me, it is about its object: I find the object, not myself, to be lovable in some way (good, admirable, worthy). In some cases at least it seems to do considerable violence to our responses if we consider them *only* subjective tremors, unrelated to anything real about the thing in question. Thus it makes sense to consider whether any real quality of the object could "call forth" such a response.

III

I have assumed that the content of moral judgment is to be supplied by the goodness or intrinsic value of things. Yet if this goodness is objective it cannot be merely a personal taste or preference for something; no merely idiosyncratic taste could serve as a basis for claims having the universality rightly ascribed to moral judgments. The good-in-itself, then, is not simply what *I* prefer, or what the social group prefers; rather, it must be what (in some sense) *anyone* would prefer, what is preferable or desirable *simply*. This obtains in the same sense as do similar judgments about scientific findings: a truth validated by scientific investigation is one in which ideally everyone *ought to* acquiesce, even if all do not; in which every ideally rational observer would agree. If there is such a thing as the objectively good, then we must assume that all perfectly reasonable persons equipped with all relevant facts, considering it, would value it; that it is not only valued, but valuable.

It seems plausible that what we mean by saying this is that the object in question is worthy of existence: we say that the good *ought to be*, the

evil *ought not to be*. If, for instance, we say that happiness is good, then we mean that people ought to be happy, or that there ought to be happy people. A good thing is a thing to be cherished and promoted, other things being equal, and an evil thing an outrage against the universe, something that should be removed.[16] To spell this out in detail would require qualifications concerning, for instance, things which are partly good and partly bad, or good in some ways and bad in others (e.g., we are to "hate the sin and love the sinner"); but the general point is fairly clear.[17]

But we have seen that certain emotional responses to things (love, or liking or affection) involve exactly this way of seeing the object: as worthy of being promoted or endorsed. We are drawn to or repelled by the object, and thus we characterize it as "attractive" or "repulsive."[18] If we are correct in so doing, it would seem that we have made a sort of primitive evaluation of it as good or bad. The emotion in us has "presented" to us the goodness or badness of the object.

Now in some cases we do not pass from feeling a certain way about something to passing a general judgment upon it; we ascribe our reaction to a personal and idiosyncratic taste ("I have this mania for the Rolling Stones") or to a peculiar situation or point of vantage ("I only enjoy this now because I haven't heard *any* music for so long"). There are analogous cases concerning the senses: "I can't see the mountains yet, but I tend to be a bit nearsighted," or "The one on the right looks larger, but I know that's just because of the angle I'm seeing it from." But in other cases we find ourselves convinced, at least prior to philosophic reflection, that our feeling does not reflect a private taste, but reveals something that is worthy of general acceptance: "I can't help feeling it's unjust to treat people this way," "There must be something wrong with you if you don't think it's good to enjoy yourself a little once in a while." In such cases I wish to claim that, as with similarly evident sense perceptions, we have a *prima facie* reason to judge the object to be objectively and really what it appears to be.

Here again the analogy with the senses may stand us in good stead. Normally *seeing a thing as X* ("it looks yellow to me," "I hear a major triad") is taken unproblematically as evidence that the thing in question is in fact *X*. We make this logical move despite the fact that our *experience* is clearly not *identical* to the thing, and the fact that our experiences may be wrong (whence the "*prima facie*" clause). There are certainly philosophical questions that can be raised about this move, and theories such as that of intentionality are designed to answer them. But in general we answer them in such a way as to go on considering things to reveal themselves in sensation,

and I will assume here that the Berkeleyan or Kantian positions that deny this are unacceptable. My argument is that *if* we accept a realism of sensation, then it seems reasonable also to consider a realism of emotion, in which "seeing a thing as good" (being attracted to it, appreciating it, loving it) is evidence for the goodness of the object. Just as sensation in some manner presents to us color, pitch, and so forth, so emotion presents goodness or badness.[19] In this case we claim, as we do with respect to scientific judgments, that the judgment asserts something of the thing itself, not merely of our opinions, and say that *it* is good or has value.

It might be objected that we often "see something as good" without at that time feeling anything in particular about it; we *know* that justice is desirable or good sense laudable, even while we are concerned with other matters and do not really care about them (in the sense of having a present emotion). But again there is an analogous case in sensation: I *know* that my car is brown although I am not seeing its brownness at the moment, and I *know* that crows are black even though it is impossible for me to have any single experience which directly gives me that *general* fact. Certainly this is true in the field of emotion as well. I may remember an emotion I once felt and agree that it revealed a reality, even when I am not now in a position to experience it again (as when I know that a Beethoven symphony is admirable, even when I have a pounding headache and cannot bear to listen). I may also make abstract judgments on the basis of specific loves or appreciations, just as I do on the basis of particular sense experiences. The abstraction is not itself an emotion any more than it is a sense experience; yet the "love of truth" is presumably based on particular experiences of truth-loving just as the judgment "all crows are black" is based on sightings of individual crows.

In general we may say that a sensation is not *itself* a judgment, but provides good grounds for a judgment.[20] Similarly, an emotion is not a judgment and cannot take the place of abstract value-judgment; but it is needed to provide an appropriate basis for such judgments. Abstraction and generalization, judgment and inference must all go to work on the data of emotion before true value-*knowledge* can be attained; but in one sense all evaluative knowledge begins in emotion, according to the view I am suggesting, just as all factual knowledge begins in the senses.

IV

A theory of the emotional presentation of goodness allows us to speak of value-knowledge without having to introduce "intuition" of an obscure

sort to attain it. According to this view, the only intuition necessary is that generally accepted for science, the immediate knowledge provided by the senses. This, together with the myriad estimates, combinations, perceptual judgments, generalizations, and collations of sensory data made by the mind in normal perception and thought, forms the substrate on which our emotional response is based. We come to a normal factual knowledge of the object, and, on this basis, evaluate it (at the most primitive level) via our affective reaction. This fits in with the notion that the goodness of something is not a discrete character separable from its other qualities, but is dependent on precisely those qualities, a "consequent property."[21] We find the object, taken as a whole or in various respects, to be attractive or repellent; to this "first impression" is applied the whole machinery of rational, critical thought, checking that result, generalizing it, and testing the generalization (is this quality in a person *always* good? When? Is equality of a certain sort *always* desirable?). The emotional presentation is necessary, for it gives us information we did not have before: that the object is *worthwhile* as well as of a certain size, shape, consistency, character. In this sense it might cautiously be called "intuition" in a sense, but it is by no means a simple process according to this theory to judge either goodness or rightness, for a great deal of perceptual organizing and understanding underlies the emotional response and considerable critical work must be performed to make it reliable knowledge.[22]

On this theory, emotion is not merely an irrational happening inside the body or mind of the individual, immune from criticism or judgment; rather, it may be *appropriate* or inappropriate to a situation, a *reasonable* or unreasonable response to some person, thing, or event. We say "you had a right to be angry about that," or "He's unreasonably jealous."[23] An emotion may be correct or incorrect, justified or not.

Linked with this is the fact that our emotions are neither infallible nor incorrigible in evaluating things. We may criticize and correct our own emotional reactions (or, at least, the judgments based on them) just as we do our sensory perceptions.[24] In the first place, we may check an evaluation against our own reactions in other conditions. It is well known that particular circumstances (a fit of depression or euphoria, a recent bereavement, partiality for extraneous reasons toward some of the objects considered) may distort our affective attitudes from what they would ordinarily be, just as a poor vantage point or a temporary illness may blur our perceptions. We learn to correct these biases and to weigh our differences in judgment at different times against each other to find out our "true" preference.

An extension of this movement toward objectivity involves deliberately changing our vantage point, as a painter may inspect his work from several different angles successively; we may actually (by spending a year in the Peace Corps) or in imagination (as with Kohlberg's well-known "role-taking") attempt to put ourselves in this position of an evaluator with different background biases and assumptions. Behind this is the notion that a *reasonable* evaluator in *any* position should recognize and agree to the correct opinion, if he is in possession of all the relevant data. Going a step further, we may actually consult others and get their opinions on the goodness or badness of something: this takes in all the proper sort of reliance on tradition and the opinion of the majority, of which the Kantian tradition in moral education represented by Kohlberg is so contemptuous. There is no question here of simply bending to the will of the majority, for the responsible evaluator weighs others' views against his own and against each other; but just as a scientist expects other scientists to be able to replicate his experiment, so the moral agent will consider it confirming evidence if others independently find the same to be true and *prima facie* grounds for doubt if they do not.[25]

In particular, he will value the opinions of *skilled* others more than those of the man in the street. The judgment of an experienced art critic, who has often (by our own judgment) been right before, will be weighed more heavily than that of someone wholly unfamiliar with the subject matter. In the same way the sage, the man of practical wisdom in moral affairs, will be rightly respected (not blindly obeyed, as depicted in descriptions of Kohlberg's conventional stage).[26] In fact, a major difference between emotional and sensory presentation seems to be that the average human being's acuity in the latter field far exceeds his abilities in the former; thus there is much more emphasis in ethics than in science on consultation with others and with the well-experienced.[27]

Finally, we may apply logic and all the arts of inference to the data gleaned from our feelings about things, just as we do to our sensations. Thus we may attempt to establish a generalization based on particular reactions ("all things of this type are intrinsically good"), and then use this general rule to overrule our own personal bias against one specimen of the type. This may explain what happens, for instance, when a person intellectually convinced of racial equality nonetheless feels uncomfortable when brought face to face with its implications. The "intellectual" commitment may be a deduction from certain generalized evaluations about what it is that makes a human being valuable, and factual information concerning which beings have those qualities; yet the particular emotional conditioning of the person

may still leave him, at least temporarily, with a "blind spot" as to the perception of this situation's or this racially different person's worth. Thus the need for accurate moral *reasoning* is not eliminated, but heightened.

We may thus begin to evaluate something objectively by attempting to strip ourselves of all unreasonable biases and influences and then considering whether it seems to us attractive or repulsive, lovable or hateful;[28] to examine it objectively through our own "subjective" reactions is no more paradoxical than the fact that we physically examine a thing by looking at it with our own eyes, for the heart of the argument is that emotions are *not* purely subjective, but intentional, presenting something about their objects. We may so inspect any actual thing we are presented with, testing it by our response to it; we may also, however, bring before us a memory of something not present, or even an imagination of something nonexistent, since our evaluative response need not take the form of an actual movement toward the object, but may be quasi-contemplative. We can, for instance, ask ourselves whether Plato's ideal city would in fact be a good city, and picture it to ourselves in order to see how we feel about it.

This sort of inspection may be applied to *things* (such as persons), to *actions* (such as martyrdom), to *states* (such as a state of justice), to *qualities* (such as beauty, which we judge to be "its own excuse," i.e., intrinsically worthwhile), and generally to anything to which we can direct our attention. It may be applied both to simple things or qualities (such as a color, a taste, a virtue) and to complexes (such as a just society). In each case our evaluative response to the object will depend, of course, on what we know about it and what it actually is; in this sense value is not entirely independent of facts (as even Moore insisted), yet we must continue to distinguish disagreement about the *facts* from disagreement about the *evaluation* of the facts.[29] We may disagree about valuation because we differ about the factual details, or we may differ because (like two scientists with different theories about the same phenomena) we have the same understanding of the situation, but differ about whether it is desirable or undesirable.

Finally, it should be noted that the position for which I am arguing holds that emotion furnishes the data for judgments of good and bad, *not* for immediate judgments of obligation, of right and wrong. On almost any teleological theory, much intellectual spadework would still remain to be done to get from one to the other, including the application of the formal reasoning processes rightly emphasized by the cognitive-developmental psychologists and by most contemporary ethicists. G. E. Moore, for example, admits an immediate intuition of good, but considers it an almost super-human task to

determine from this what is right, because of the complexity of the world.[30] Meinong does describe a "presentation" of obligation in *desire*, paralleling that of value in emotion;[31] W. D. Ross, similarly, suggests an intuition of rightness as well as goodness.[32] I shall not argue for such a position here; if there are such presentations of rightness, they would have to be subject to the same sort of fallibility and cross-checking against other evidence as we have noted in the case of emotional presentation, but it will be sufficient for our purposes if the latter can be established.

V

It may seem that there is a certain circularity in the argument. I have claimed that my own value-judgments (judgments based on emotional responses) are fallible, but may be corrected by others of my value-judgments, or by judgments made by other people on the same sort of basis, or by deductions from still more knowledge of a similar kind. Yet none of this gives us any appeal in the end from someone's love or hate of something in estimating value. How can we accept such experiences as solid evidence for objective good or evil on no warrant but its own?

While the question is a valid one, its force in this context may be mitigated by the fact that, once again, an analogous difficulty exists in the realm of the senses. Unless some intellectual intuition is assumed, all our knowledge of the external world depends on our senses; and the only appeal from such knowledge, the only way of correcting or checking it, involves appealing to other sensations of the same sort.[33] Yet we normally accept the vast ensemble of such sensory data, all (under careful intellectual consideration) building up a reasonably coherent picture of the universe, as constituting at least *prima facie* warrant for its acceptance by a reasonable person as representing reality. We do not generally, as Descartes advised, doubt all that can be doubted, but rather give the apparent the benefit of the doubt. If this is a reasonable procedure with the senses, is it not equally reasonable with the data of the emotions?

In fact this difficulty is merely one expression of the basic problem of epistemology: unless something is given, nothing can be derived. The root assumption of the position outlined in this paper is that things should be accepted as they appear to be, until shown to be otherwise; or, alternatively, that our knowing abilities (in this case, our tendencies to emotional response) are at least to some degree trustworthy, and that they can, if properly used, reveal the truth.[34] I am not attempting here to argue this point, but simply

to argue by analogy: if we do accept the evidence of the senses, then if the evidence presented by emotion seems to fit the same model, we should accept it in the same fashion.

It should be possible to say more definitely what it is in the person that is responsible for his "tendencies to emotional response." When we assert that some sensations are to be trusted and others are not (e.g., seeing a stick plunged into water as bent), we must account in detail for the fact that the stick appears different in different situations, and we do so by an elaboration which makes reference to light, the structure of the eye and nervous system, and possibly also the broader psychological states as well (as when someone "fails to see" something for unconscious reasons). What, then, determines what our emotional "perceptions" in a given case will be? It seems plausible, though there is not room here to develop this in detail, that it is the established tendencies of the person's character which play the major role in determining emotional response. Certainly tendencies to feel a certain way can be learned directly: one can fall into a habit of getting angry, or of not getting angry, in general or at certain objects. But there may be reason to think that a well-ordered character (one which enables the person to *act* rightly and effectively) will enable the person to respond properly to things; in fact, as we noted, the affective and the desiderative response may be connected. Classical ethical theories have on occasion noted that it is the person who is *already* good or virtuous who is able to see the point of virtue, the value or worth of acting well.[35] On the emotional presentation theory, this is because both the action and the knowledge are shaped by the habits and formed tendencies of the agent.

It should be noted that the stress here laid on the cognitive or presenting function of the emotions is not meant to suggest that cognition and emotion are identical. In order to counter the tendency to think of emotion as non-cognitive I have emphasized the respects in which affective response plays a role similar to that of sensation; but this does not, of course, remove their significant differences.

VI

If the theory of emotional presentation sketched above is correct, what sort of educational theory might follow from it, and what empirical results should be observable? In the first place, it would seem that almost everyone would have some emotional data to work from, and hence some idea of what things are good and bad, albeit perhaps a confused and uncritical idea. This

would explain the fact that so many agree on certain relatively uncontroversial goods: pleasure, freedom, the satisfaction of desires or interests, social welfare. On the above account, however, this notion of the desirable could be *improved* in a way analogous to the way one learns visual or auditory discrimination, by increasing one's skill in "perception" or fine "sensibility." It seems most likely that this would occur, as does the training of an eye or a palate, through practice. Wide experience of different goods, along with critical consideration and comparison of them, should help develop a person able to make good moral value-judgments; even some experience, at least at a distance, with evaluating evils might also be necessary (we often criticize the lack of accurate moral perception of the overly sheltered innocent). It would follow that good value-judgment should correlate with having passed through certain sorts of value-experiences or appreciations of good and evil.[36]

Since a *critical* consideration of these experiences is necessary, akin to that of the scientist in sifting data, moral development would also require that such findings be thought through, conflicts tested, and generalizations attempted. One type of morally immature person may be conscious of goods and evils in a haphazard way, but unable to coordinate this knowledge and to make abstract judgments. Maturity should be encouraged in this respect by the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance used by Piaget and Kohlberg in the development of reasoning: the agent is faced with what seems to be a contradiction or an insoluble problem in his current terms and is thus forced to hunt for new ones. Here, this would involve, for instance, placing what seems normally to be good in a situation where it seems bad, or vice versa, and requiring the person to think through the distinctions and make the judgments necessary to make sense of the picture.

Since this sort of experience is the sort that also develops moral reasoning concerning universal *rules*, according to Kohlberg's findings, it should be the case that in general formal development and value-development occur together. However, it should still be possible to identify occasional cases where one type of development has continued and the other been arrested, due to unusual circumstances, showing that the two types are in fact distinct. On the one hand, we might have formal development without emotional development. This would seem to indicate a person able to reason well in an instrumental fashion, and willing to universalize (apply the same standards to himself and others), but caring nothing for other people (or possibly for himself). What is suggested is the rational, but amoral and apparently guiltless figure sometimes referred to as a "psychopath" or "sociopath." If the person is not of violently self-seeking inclinations, however, this might be expressed

simply in an inability to see anything in life which is good and therefore really worth seeking – the candidate for suicide or perhaps the existentialist philosopher.[37] On the other hand, development of emotional perceptiveness without comparable rational (i.e., cognitive) development might produce a well-intentioned but unreflective person, readily sympathetic but not inclined to make the logical leap of applying universal standards where immediate sympathy does not exist, unable to sort out the fine distinctions in a complex case, though overflowing with "compassion." Such a description might easily fit someone at Kohlberg's stage three or four, conforming to ordinary rules and seeing their worth in normal circumstances and within the social group, but uncertain of his ground outside it. In the extreme, such a person might be hypersensitive to pain and pleasure, but wholly unable to see the larger implications – a caricature of the "flower child." If measures for maturity of value-judgment and of emotional maturity could be designed, and if they correlated in this way with such behavior patterns, this would seem to confirm the theory proposed.

In general, if the theory of emotional presentation is correct, we should expect that certain character types should correlate with certain types of evaluation. Clusters of value-judgments such as those studied by Lorr, Suziedelis, and Tonesk, for example,[38] might be checked against clusters of emotional habits or traits. But I have suggested not only that a tendency to certain emotions tends to condition value-opinions in certain ways, but that *correct* emotional balance and training should lead to *correct* value-opinions and to an ability to be self-correcting in them, continuing to fit new data into one's schemes and to sharpen one's perceptions. This suggests the hypothesis that it is those morally well-trained in youth who will be able to criticize and correct the traditions they were brought up in, and to break away from them if necessary, while those brought up without any specific moral training in certain sorts of behavior will find themselves unable to decide which behavior is better in later years, unable to locate the first principles of ethics.

Finally, of course, if the goodness or badness of things is really an objective matter, then it should be that the morally well-trained, those whose emotional responses are properly ordered, or in a word the good men, make similar value-judgments. The decisions should tend to converge as one rises to finer and finer moral perceptiveness. The saints or moral heroes of one civilization or era should tend to value the same *basic* things as those of others.[39] If this can be empirically investigated, then the lesson of the Hartshorne-May studies earlier in the century should be kept in mind: every

effort must be made not to confuse basic value-judgments with specific situational decisions logically far more complex than these, for it would be the morally mature person who could apply his value-judgments most flexibly and adequately to varying situations (which is not the same as changing the standards at will). Further, the standards of agreement we should expect would not be those of mathematics, but those of the sciences, since we are speaking of the empirical side of ethics, not the a priori; and such looser "sciences" as economics, sociology, and political science should be included here. It seems plausible that on many basic subjects, from pleasure and pain to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," a degree of agreement could be obtained comparable to that achieved by the human sciences, and this should serve as evidence that ethics is here dealing with objective realities, not simply arbitrary individual preferences.

Such suggestions are vague and programmatic at best. If they can be of assistance in stimulating research and spurring the development of adequate theoretical proposals in the area of value-knowledge, the purpose of this paper will have been served.

NOTES

[1] The writing of this paper was supported by funds from the Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth Development. However, the opinions expressed or the policies advocated herein do not necessarily reflect those of Boys Town.

[2] See, among other works, Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, 'From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development,' in Theodore Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic Press, 1971); Lawrence Kohlberg, 'The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education,' *Phi Delta Kappan*, June 1975, reprinted in Peter Scharf, ed., *Readings in Moral Education* (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1978); Lawrence Kohlberg, 'Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach,' in Thomas Lickona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976).

[3] See, for instance, Brian Crittenden, *Form and Content in Moral Educattion: An Essay on Aspects of the Mackay Report*, Monograph Series no. 12 (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1972); Richard S. Peters, 'Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions,' in Nancy F. Sizer and Theodore R. Sizer, eds., *Moral Education: Five Lectures* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), and *Reason and Compassion* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). Some recent statements by Kohlberg have acknowledged that more attention should be given to content. See Lawrence Kohlberg, 'Revisions in the Theory and Practice of Moral Development,' in *Moral Development*, ed. William Damon, New Directions in Child Development, no. 2 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

1978), pp. 83–87; and 'High School Democracy and Educating for a Just Society,' in *Moral Education: A First Generation of Research and Development*, ed. Ralph L. Mosher (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 20–57.

[4] This point is argued in Rick Ellrod, 'Morality and Interests: A Critique of Kohlberg's Ethical Theory,' *Communio* 7 (Fall, 1980): 259–68.

[5] See Alexius Meinong, *On Emotional Presentation*, trans. with an introduction by Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi, with a foreword by J. N Findlay (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Franz Brentano, *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, ed. Oskar Kraus, trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); Franz Brentano, *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics*, compiled by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, English edition edited and translated by Elizabeth Hughes Schneewind, International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).

[6] "We do not make all our choices for the sake of something else – for in this way the process will go on indefinitely so that our desire would be futile and pointless . . ." (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962], bk. 1, chap. 1, 1094a21). Some popular objections to this view are discussed by C. S. Lewis in *The Abolition of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 42–53.

[7] E.g., James E. Royce, S. J., *Man and Meaning* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 138–39; W. McDougall, 'Emotion and Feeling Distinguished,' reprinted in Magda B. Arnold, ed., *The Nature of Emotion*, Penguin Modern Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 62–64; M. B. Arnold and J. A. Gasson, S. J. 'Feelings and Emotions as Dynamic Factors in Personality Integration,' reprinted in Arnold, ed., pp. 205, 209–12.

[8] Brentano, *Origin*, p. 17.

[9] Love (and hate as its negation) has often been considered the basic or primary emotion. Cf. Brentano, *Foundation*, p. 200; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II–II, Q. 47, A. 1, ad 1; Royce, p. 142.

[10] Cf. Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), p. 132; Royce, p. 148; G. Dumas, 'Emotional Shocks and Emotions,' reprinted in Arnold, ed., p. 113.

[11] Cf. Meinong, p. 98.

[12] For instance, Royce, pp. 139–41; Arnold & Gasson, pp. 204–5, 215, 219.

[13] Cf. Solomon, p. 132; Royce, pp. 138–39.

[14] Brentano, *Origin*, p. 14; Meinong, pp. 8–9, 28–29; Findlay, pp. 3–4; Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion,' in Linda L. McAlister, ed., *The Philosophy of Brentano* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1976), pp. 170–71; Howard O. Eaton, *The Austrian Philosophy of Values* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), pp. 237–38.

[15] In fact absolutely complete knowledge may be impossible for human beings, since we cannot view all sides of something at once, or touch all parts of it without disintegrating it; but this is not relevant to my argument. See Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 52–53, 88–93, 102–103.

[16] Cf. Findlay, p. 301.

[17] This chracterization applies to both moral and nonmoral goods; if by "moral" we

mean "pertaining directly to human character and virtue," the original sense, then both moral goods such as courage and nonmoral goods such as beauty "deserve to be promoted," although perhaps not equally. On the other hand, if by "moral goods" we mean "social or interpersonal, as opposed to private, goods," then both of these ought to be endorsed, although again, perhaps, not equally. If by "moral goods" we mean simply any goods that are universally rationally approvable, then these become identical to what I have called "objective goods," and the characterization applies only to these; but then beauty, for example, if objectively approvable, will be a "moral good."

[18] This quasi-aesthetic aspect of good is reflected in the Greek word *kalon*, which means both good, noble, and beautiful, admirable, attractive.

[19] This is the kernel of Meinong's position. See esp. pp. 7–8, 23, 121–22, 129–30, and Chapter 12 generally. See also Brentano, *Origin*, pp. 13–18, and *Foundation*, pp. 50–51, 133–134; J. N. Findlay, *Axiological Ethics*, New Studies in Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 32–33; W. H. Werkmeister, *Historical Spectrum of Value Theories* (Lincoln: Johnson, 1970), 1: 82–83.

[20] Brentano, *Origin*, pp. 15–16; *Foundation*, p. 137.

[21] Cf. Meinong, pp. 92–93, 95–96, 117; and cf. W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 28, 122–23.

[22] Cf. Kalsi, 'Translator's Introduction,' in Meinong, pp. lxv–lxvi.

[23] See Lewis, pp. 25–30.

[24] See Meinong, pp. 106–7, 121–23, 151–53; Findlay, *Meinong's Theory*, p. 317, and *Axiological Ethics*, p. 34; Eaton, pp. 210–13; cf. Brentano, *Origin*, pp. 19–21, 24, and *Foundation*, pp. 16–20.

[25] Meinong, pp. 152–53; Kalsi, p. lxvi.

[26] Meinong, pp. 122, 128; Kalsi, p. lxvi.

[27] Meinong, p. 122.

[28] Cf. Moore's "method of isolation" (G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* [Cambridge: University Press, 1959]), pp. 91, 187, 197.

[29] Cf. Meinong's notion of "psychological presupposition"; see pp. 27, 47, 64, 114; Findlay, *Meinong's Theory*, p. 316; and cf. Richard S. Peters, *Reason and Compassion*, pp. 82–83.

[30] Moore, pp. 152–55.

[31] Meinong, esp. pp. 91, 98–99.

[32] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, pp. 11–12, 63, 110, 132; *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 170, 254.

[33] See Findlay, *Meinong's Theory*, p. 319. The argument concerning the senses alone is made by Gilbert Ryle in *Dilemmas* (Cambridge: University Press, 1954), pp. 95–97.

[34] Cf. René Descartes, *Meditations*, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), IV, especially pp. 108–110, 114–116. In this connection it may be significant for moral development that according to Erik H. Erikson the first developmental task for a child is to attain a certain *trust* – trust, we may say here, that the universe will not inevitably deceive him. See *Childhood & Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), pp. 247, 251. Cf. also the arguments of Carl Rogers and others that without self-esteem (including some trust in one's own powers to know good and bad) proper development as a moral agent is impossible. See Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, *Person to Person* (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), pp. 12–13.

[35] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095b4–13, 1114a31–b25, 1144a30–37. See also the notion of *connatural knowledge* in the Scholastics; e.g., Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I–II, Q. 58, A. 5; Q. 94, A. 2; II–II, Q. 47, A. 15. The argument is also made by Lewis, pp. 59–61, and suggested by Meinong, p. 128.

[36] Cf. Kenneth Pahel, 'Moral Motivation,' in D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides (ed.), *The Domain of Moral Education* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979; Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1979), p. 143.

[37] Cf. Solomon's contention on the "meaning of life" in *The Passions*. Solomon, however, makes no claims for intrinsic goodness or "emotional presentation."

[38] See Maurice Lorr, Antanas Suziedelis, and Xenia Tonesk, 'The Structure of Values: Conceptions of the Desirable,' *Journal of Research in Personality* 7 (1973): 139–147.

[39] Lewis makes a casual compilation of such agreements (Appendix, pp. 95–121).